Nicaragua's political panorama going into November's presidential campaign

By Karla Jacobs, March 23rd 2011

March 18th was the deadline for the political alliances and parties planning to take part in Nicaragua's presidential election on November 6th to inscribe their presidential and vice presidential candidates with the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE). With that procedure completed, the political panorama leading into those national elections is far clearer.

The respective candidates for the five political currents taking part in the Nicaraguan election process are as follows:

Name of alliance / party Presidential candidate Vice Presidential candidate

FSLN led Unida Nicaragua Triunfa
alliance (left) Daniel Ortega Omar Halleslevens

PLC led GANA alliance
(center right) Arnoldo Alemán Francisco Aguirre

PLI led UNE alliance (far right) Fabio Gadea Edmundo Jarquín

ALN (far right) Enrique Quiñónez Diana Urbina

APRE (far right) Miguel Garcia Elizabeth Rojas

The two most recent opinion polls to have been published in Nicaragua place Ortega in first place with a significant advantage over both Alemán and Gadea. The extent to which public approval ratings for the three main presidential candidates vary according to these polls, however, has raised suspicions among many analysts about the accuracy with which they can be accredited.

An M&R Consultants poll carried out in December 2010 found that 42.7% of the population plan to vote for Ortega, 14.4% for Fabio Gadea and 7.4% for Alemán. A Cid Gallup poll carried out a month later in January 2011, meanwhile, found that 36% plan to vote for Ortega, 23% for Alemán and 17% for Gadea.

Omar Halleslevens: FSLN’s vice presidential candidate

Perhaps the most interesting and, for some, surprising outcome of the presidential and vice presidential candidate inscription process was the inscription of former head of the Nicaraguan Armed Forces Omar Halleslevens as Daniel Ortega's running mate. While it had become clear in recent weeks that current Vice President Jaime Morales Carazo was not planning to stand again, the FSLN's alternative candidate was kept a secret until the day of the inscription.

Halleslevens, a former FSLN guerrilla and founder of the Nicaraguan Army, was head of the armed forces between 2005 and 2010. During his time in the top post he was shown consistently to be one of the most popular public figures in Nicaragua.

In an M&R opinion poll published in October 2009, just four months before Halleslevens' term as head of the armed forces came to an end, he was found to be the second most popular public figure in the country, second only to head of the National Police, Aminta Granera. The same poll found that 73.3% of the public regarded the National Army as the most trustworthy public institution in the country.

Political analyst and writer Toni Solo considers the choice of Halleslevens as vice presidential candidate for the FSLN led Unida Nicaragua Triunfa alliance to be “very astute.”

As Solo points out in Tortilla con Sal's most recent audio commentary on Nicaraguan current events, Halleslevens' candidacy not only satisfies the need felt among much of the FSLN's grass roots support network for fewer major concessions to be made to the FSLN's political allies, but the choice is also one which furthers greatly the FSLN government's double motto of national unity and reconciliation.

Although Halleslevens can be considered a national figure “very much within the Sandinista family, … he is as far as you could imagine from being someone you would describe as a sectarian political figure,” says Solo, “…[he] symbolizes national unity and reconciliation.”

It also seems unlikely that the predictable opposition argument that Halleslevens' candidacy in some way represents the militarization of civil power will have much impact on the FSLN's campaign given his previously mentioned popularity which is based to a large extent on the predominant feeling among ordinary Nicaraguans that Halleslevens is a moderate, sensitive and thoroughly unaggressive person.

ALN: the unpredictable factor in November's elections

There were no other real surprises on March 18th other than a last minute change of heart by evangelical pastor Elizabeth Rojas who decided not to run as Enrique Quiñónez' vice presidential candidate on the ALN ticket but to run with Miguel Angel García, former education minister (from the Bolaños government), as a candidate for the little known APRE party.

This decision, apparently, was the outcome of a last minute breakdown in negotiations between Quiñónez' campaign team and the Evangelical organization Asamblea de Dios (which Rojas represents) regarding quotas of power within their informal electoral alliance.

Some analysts believe this last minute split from the Asamblea de Dios marks a significant setback for the Quiñónez led ALN electoral campaign given the potential such an alliance would have offered in terms of penetrating the ever increasing presence and influence of Evangelical churches at a grass roots level.

Saying that though, Quiñónez' talent as a political operator has been underlined by other recent events concerning his campaign namely his success in convincing both prominent PLC member José Rizo and popular far right TV presenter Jaime Arellano to support his campaign.

These fluctuations within the ALN political current are symbolic of the unpredictability of this political force which recent polls place in a distant fourth place but which, technically, is considered the second strongest political force by the CSE given that it came in second place in the 2006 presidential elections as part of an alliance led by former presidential candidate Eduardo Montealegre.

Being considered the second force entails a range of privileges regarding the party's presence at voting centers which will play in the ALN's favour on election-day. It seems realistic at this point, however, to say the best outcome the ALN can hope for would be one that allowed the party to maintain the six National Assembly seats currently occupied by ALN representatives.

Battle will be between FSLN and PLC

As Nicaraguan political analyst William Grigsby suggests in a recent article about the current national political situation (“Victoria del FSLN hará posible profundizar los cambios,” http://www.tortillaconsal.com/tortilla/node/8001 [1]), there is reason to believe that, despite the corporate media's hype surrounding the candidacy of Fabio Gadea, November's presidential elections will turn out to be a battle fought principally between the FSLN and the PLC led alliances.

As part of his overall analysis Grigsby points out that not only are there many reasons why Gadea's candidacy is unlikely to appeal to the average Nicaraguan voter (he is too old, too unknown and too uncharismatic) but, being a newly formed political alliance, the PLI alliance backing Gadea lacks the necessary grass roots organizational structure so essential to electoral success in Nicaragua.

Just to take part in a national election parties require a minimum of 60,000 grass roots militants around the country who represent their party at voting centers on election day, a prerequisite it is far from clear the PLI alliance, with its mish mash make up of mini political factions and party dissidents, is able to fulfill.

Another disadvantage faced by the PLI is the likelihood that, between now and May when political alliances should inscribe their candidates for deputies, major internal divisions will threaten the alliance's integrity as too many candidates squabble over the small number of winning positions the alliance has to offer.

The PLC, on the other hand, has the advantage of having what can be considered the closest thing to a strong presidential candidate the Nicaraguan right has been able to come up with - Arnoldo Alemán. Despite being largely discredited among many national sectors as a result of the endless list of major corruption scandals linked to his time as president (1990 - 96), Alemán has natural leadership qualities and knows how to relate to the PLC’s grass roots supporters.

Saying that though, the fact that the PLC is not going into the elections as Nicaragua's second force (its usual status) does represent a significant disadvantage, as does the corroding effect the last six or seven years of profound divisions within the party has had on the confidence and morale of the PLC's traditional support base.

Nicaraguan right in much weaker position than in 2006

Undeniably the Nicaraguan right wing opposition is going into the 2011 general elections in a much weaker position than they did the 2006 elections. Not only is the right wing very much more divided than it was five years ago (both in terms of the number of political currents and the reach of internal divisions within those currents) but politically, their arguments and positions have been thoroughly discredited by the FSLN government's successful implementation of its program.

Since 1990 the right wing managed to keep the FSLN out of power by claiming a Sandinista government would amount not just to an economic debacle but also to the return of some sort of armed conflict. It was the effectiveness of this fear campaign and not the results of their own programs of government that kept the right in power for sixteen years.

The last four years of FSLN government have had the effect of giving the lie to the right's anti FSLN propaganda while the Sandinista government's success in bringing about major improvements to all aspects of Nicaragua's national life (economy, road and energy generation infrastructure, health care and education to mention only the most obvious) has had the effect of underlining to Nicaraguan voters the right wing parties' scandalous ineffectiveness when they were in power.

And the recent change in the main right wing candidates' discourse in which promises have been made that the social and infrastructural programs implemented by the FSLN since 2007 will be maintained if they win the elections is likely to fall on deaf ears as the Nicaraguan electorate asks itself why, then, the right wing did not implement such programs during the sixteen years they were in office.

To achieve goal of 50 plus deputies, FSLN must fight complacency

Around the time of the inscription of political alliances earlier this month the FSLN's official aim to not just win the presidency but also to win a majority of 50 or more seats in the National Assembly came to light. (Currently the FSLN alliance holds 38 of the 92 National Assembly seats.)

Poll results over the last year or so would lead one to believe that it is by no means unreasonable for the FSLN to expect to fulfill this aim. The experience of the 1989 presidential elections when the FSLN unexpectedly lost to Violeta Barrios and the UNO alliance, however, had the effect of teaching the FSLN leaders the bitter lesson that complacency and triumphalism are the party's worst enemies when it comes to election time.

In order to ensure a majority in the Nicaraguan legislative, the FSLN - as its leaders are fully aware - will need to work hard to raise awareness among its active grass roots support network about the need to go after every last possible vote, with special emphasis on the votes of those who normally abstain or vote for right wing parties.

Should the FSLN achieve 50 plus deputies in November's elections it would represent a definite historical shift in terms of Nicaraguan politics in which the Sandinistas consolidate themselves as the natural party of government for the first time since 1986. Such a victory would also hail a new phase of this FSLN government in which the party is much freer to bring about more profound social and economic change without being obliged to take into account the weight of a right wing majority in the country's parliament.

But seven and a half months is a long time in today's world, shaken so violently by the unpredictable and ever changing fallout of numerous global crises. In this sense it is difficult to anticipate to what extent and in what ways the fluctuating international situation will affect the Central American region and, more specifically, Nicaragua in the run up to the country's presidential elections.