Marco Teruggi, Internationalist 360°, June 8th 2019
https://libya360.wordpress.com/2019/06/08/the-venezuelan-rights-oslo-cr…
The Venezuelan right wing has a repeated pattern of behaviour: it strategizes all or nothing without the necessary means to achieve it. This happened in 2017 and has happened again in 2019. On both occasions it summoned its followers to overthrow Nicolás Maduro without opening the possibility of an intermediate negotiation. In 2017 the result was a defeat with a domino effect that resulted in confrontational internal disputes and electoral failures. At this moment the question is: will the same thing happen? That possibility is functioning as a desperate accelerator in some of its ranks.
This new assault has a variable that complicates the picture: the design of a parallel government without the capacity to govern internally, but with partial international diplomatic recognition as a means of legalizing unilateral aggressions by the United States (USA). How to undo the construction of Juan Guaidó as interim president with his representatives in organizations such as the OAS and recognized as ambassadors in several countries? The move was considered a point of no return from a mistaken reading of the battlefield.
That initial miscalculation was similar to 2017: underestimation of Chavismo as a force with identity and social roots, reduction of leadership to Nicolás Maduro and a handful of civilians and military, the imminent collapse of the Bolivarian National Armed Force (FANB), the explosion of the popular neighbourhoods in the face of the economic crisis and direct sabotage. That combination of factors was to resolve the Maduro question. However, what was predicted happened: the failure of the ultimate goal.
This situation emerges clearly when placed in the chronology of the four main events of this year. The first on January 23, the date of Guaidó’s self-proclamation accompanied by violent actions during the days that followed. The second on February 23 with the attempt of entry by force via Colombia. The third with the attack on the electricity system at the beginning of March that pushed the country to a critical situation. The fourth was the military manoeuvre of April 30 which failed and resulted in arrests, flight to embassies and lamentations. Then came the public acknowledgement of the dialogues in Oslo and what happened in each scenario that takes the form of defeat: exposure of divisions.
Oslo means more than Oslo: it represents one of the two arenas that automatically divide the Venezuelan right. The first is dialogue, the other is elections. In Norway both issues are interwoven, dialogue is, among other things, to reach a possible electoral resolution. The opposition thus enters into confrontation and crossfire, it is no longer contained by the umbrella that Guaidó repeats as a mantra: cessation of usurpation, transitional government, free elections.
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said it in an audio released on Wednesday: “Keeping the opposition united was devilishly difficult for us. Three things are clear from his words: first, that it has been the American operators, such as Pompeo, John Bolton, Elliot Abrams and Marcos Rubio, who have organized the strategy; second, that the achievement of unstable unity was made possible because of them; and third, that a favorable resolution for the right is dependent on the United States.
It is necessary to describe the Venezuelan right, its narratives about a possible exit of Maduro and what would come next, within the hypothetical scenarios of victory they construct.
First, there is a sector that has five nodal points: Maduro’s exit as a condition for any other step, the denial of any kind of dialogue with Chavismo, or any form of shared transition architecture – a spectre that is recurrently mentioned – of Chavismo’s participation in possible elections, and its very existence once it has occupied political power. This last one implies the erasure of both the main political instrument that is the United Socialist Party of Venezuela, as well as each person who has occupied a government position. This narrative is supported by figures such as María Corina Machado, Antonio Ledezma, and communicational operators from Miami such as Patricia Poleo.
Second, there are those who argue that the first step should be -according to the previous narrative- Maduro’s exit, but then leave the possibilities open. Dialogue is possible and necessary to move forward, there may be amnesties for high military and governmental officials, and the continued existence of the PSUV as a party is recognized. The one who expresses this idea clearly, without pressure from other right-wing sectors and from the same social base, is Elliot Abrams, who repeatedly maintained that Maduro’s exit is non-negotiable, and that the rest may be subject to agreement, recognizing the PSUV and its social impact.
The game is deadlocked and the passage of time places the right in a situation which leads to desperation: it loses capacity and credibility. This position obliges them to attempt forceful actions to improve their position at the table with the government and international mediators. For the moment they have stated that there is no agreement in Oslo and that their roadmap remains the same. In this context, President Maduro announced that the Security and Defence Council will be in permanent session.
What will the U.S. attempt? How far are they willing to advance positions to achieve their goal? How much longer given their prospect of the next electoral scenario? Abrams wrote on Thursday that one of the possible forms of resolution is for Chavismo to dissolve the National Constituent Assembly – which has already voted to remain in office until the end of 2020 – to be incorporated into the NA, and from there advance through a transition without Maduro. The special envoy for Venezuela is aiming to divide, open escape doors, and manoeuvrer to achieve his objectives. The entire spectrum of the right is excluded from these decisions: those who rule are outside the country.