Stephen Sefton, Tortilla con Sal, November 23rd 2012
November 19th is a new date for Nicaraguan and Colombian school children to remember in future history classes. On that day this year, the International Court of Justice confirmed Colombia's sovereign rights over the Caribbean island of San Andres and the nearby islets and keys. But the court also confirmed Nicaragua's maritime rights, usurped by force by Colombia ever since 1928.
In that year, over 80 years ago, Nicaragua was under military occupation by the United States. In 1930, its puppet government was bullied into ratifying the unconstitutional Bárcenas Meneses-Esguerra Treaty which gave Colombia rights over the small island of San Andres and the surrounding sea. Since then Colombia has unilaterally enforced the 82nd meridian as its maritime frontier with Nicaragua, something not set out even in the controversial 1928 treaty.
Nicaraguan historians note that the conflict is over 200 years old, dating back to the Spanish colonial period before Nicaragua existed as an independent State. Subsequently, throughout the 19th Century, Colombia affirmed its claims, not just to San Andres, but to all of Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast, without success. Later still, from 1917 onwards, Colombia and the United States agreed between themselves the terms of what became the 1928 Treaty, ignoring well-established legal precedent in the region favouring Nicaragua.
Even the Somoza dictatorship challenged US government collusion with Colombia's unilateral appropriation of Nicaraguan maritime territory. After a dispute with Nicaragua over oil exploration rights in 1969, the US and Colombia tried to impose the Saccio-Vázquez Carrizosa Treaty in 1972, illegally awarding non-existent US rights to Colombia. The Somoza regime managed to stall the treaty in the US Congress, leaving it unratified.
Only after 1980, when the revolutionary Government of National Reconstruction declared the 1928 Treaty null and void, did Colombia successfully seek US ratification, under the Reagan administration, of the 1972 Treaty. That agreement awarded Colombia notional US rights over the Quitasueño, Roncador and Serrano Keys. Then in 1986, Colombia signed another tendentious treaty, this time with Honduras, again stripping Nicaragua of its legitimate maritime rights.
For almost a hundred years up until the ICJ judgment of November 19th, Colombia sought to establish illegitimate de facto rights over Nicaragua's maritime territory through treaties with various countries, ignoring Nicaragua. Under US patronage, it enforced those spurious rights by means of its vastly superior military capability. In the last days of Arnoldo Alemán's presidency, in December 2001, Nicaragua began proceedings in the International Court of Justice seeking an independent arbitration of its maritime limits with Colombia. This initiative gave continuity to the process begun in 1980 and carried on by all successive Nicaraguan governments.
In December 2007, the International Court of Justice recognized the validity of the 1928 Bárcenas Meneses-Esguerra treaty in terms of Colombia's jurisidiction over San Andres. But the ICJ also confirmed that the Treaty did not give Colombia the right to claim the 82nd meridian as its maritime frontier with Nicaragua. Colombia and Nicaragua both accepted the ICJ 's jurisdiction, something they are bound to do as signatories of the 1948 Treaty of Bogotá, committing States to resolve their conflicts by peaceful means.
Now after over a decade of proceedings and deliberations, the International Court of Justice has made its judgment. The ICJ has vindicated Colombia's claim to San Andres and the neighbouring islets and keys. It has also vindicated Nicaragua's claim to its legitimate maritime rights. After explaining methodology for establishing the maritime boundary between Colombia and Nicaragua, the text of the judgment turns to the issue of equity and proportionality, reading:
“the Court notes that the boundary line has the effect of dividing the relevant area between the Parties in a ratio of approximately 1:3.44 in Nicaragua’s favour, while the ratio of relevant coasts is approximately 1:8.2. The question therefore is whether, in the circumstances of the present case, this disproportion is so great as to render the result inequitable. The Court concludes that, taking account of all the circumstances of the present case, the result achieved by the maritime delimitation does not entail such a disproportionality as to create an inequitable result.”
Here is the relevant map :
The meaning of this judgment is that Nicaragua now has jurisdiction over around 75,000 square kilometres of maritime territory previously unilaterally usurped by force by Colombia for over 80 years. Colombia is now obliged to withdraw its warships which have harrassed Nicaraguan boats for decades. The judgment also means that Nicaragua has aerial rights over that same territory. Nicaragua now has exclusive rights to the marine and other resources in the sea and the continental platform in the area adjudicated to it by the ICJ ruling.
The reactions of the two governments to the ruling could hardly be in greater contrast. In Managua, President Daniel Ortega made a public statement accepting the judgment despite having lost Nicaragua's claim to San Andres. He spoke in the presence of all the previous Presidents and foreign ministers, except Violeta Chamorro who was unable to participate for health reasons. Nicaraguans of all political views regard the judgment with relief as a final vindication of their long standing grievance against Colombia's centuries old regional expansionism .
The reaction was very different in Colombia. There, President Santos welcomed the ICJ ruling but rejected its elements favourable to Nicaragua. Colombia has been ruled by a small group of extremely wealthy families ever since independence from Spain. They share the gross racism typical of the region's elites from the Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego. For them, losing extensive territory they had usurped as their own is a national humiliation.
Opinion among the elite in Colombia suggests they will reject the ICJ judgment regardless of the consequences. They know they are militarily far more powerful than Nicaragua. They believe they can rely on the unconditional support of the United States. Like their zionist allies in Israel, they know very well the United Nations system will most likely prove impotent to stop them doing what they want, given the US veto in the Security Council.
The conflict will provide a strong test of the viability of new regional institutions like the Community of Latin American States (CELAC) and the Union of South American States (UNASUR). For Nicaragua's allies in the Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas (ALBA) the conflict will be a trial of the viability of their commitment to diplomacy and dialogue to address conflicts. For the United States government the conflict is a great opportunity to divide and rule, as European and United States governments have always done throughout Latin America's modern history.
For Nicaragua's part, President Daniel Ortega has already made clear that nothing will change for the inhabitants of San Andres and its neighbouring islets in terms of their access and ability to fish sea areas now adjudicated to Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan government is waiting to see what, in the end, the Colombian government decides to do. The ICJ judgment is binding and not subject to appeal.
The Colombian government is weighing up the costs and benefits of rejecting the ICJ ruling. Hypocritical double-dealing and a sadistic addiction to murderous armed force have characterized the Colombian ruling elite since independence from Spain and their betrayal of Simón Bolívar. That odious historical tradition has continued in the last few decades, since the murder of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan in 1948. The chances of an opportune and open handed acceptance by Colombia of the ICJ ruling look very slim.